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This article summarizes exchange-rate research using microstructure models. It rst lays out the key
features of the foreign exchange market and describes how they are incorporated into a canonical model of
currency trading. The empirical implications of the model are then examined. The article also discusses
how currency trading links spot rate dynamics to macroeconomic conditions, and how this link sheds light
on some long-standing puzzles concerning the behavior of exchange rates.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Models of Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure examine the determination and behavior of spot exchange
rates in an environment that replicates the key features of trading in the foreign exchange (FX) market.
Traditional macro exchange rate models play little attention to how trading in the FX market actually takes
place. The implicit assumption is that the details of trading (i.e., who quotes currency prices and how trade
takes place) are unimportant for the behavior of exchanger a t e so v e rm o n t h s ,q u a r t e r so rl o n g e r .M i c r o - b a s e d
models, by contrast, examine how information relevant to the pricing of foreign currency becomes reected
in the spot exchange rate via the trading process. According to this view, trading is not an ancillary market
activity that can be ignored when considering exchange rate behavior. Rather, trading is an integral part of
the process through which spot rates are determined and evolve.
The past decade has witnessed rapid growth in micro-based exchange-rate research. Originally the focus
was on partial equilibrium models that captured the key features of FX trading. These models provided
a new and rich array of empirical predictions that are strongly supported by the data and provide a new
perspective on the proximate drivers of exchange rates over short horizons, ranging from a few minutes to
WThe paper was prepared as an entry for the Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization.
1af e ww e e k s . R e c e n tm i c r o - b a s e dr e s e a r c hm o v e sa w a yf r o mt h et r a d i t i o n a lp a r t i a le q u i l i b r i u md o m a i no f
microstructure models to focus on the link between currency trading and macroeconomic conditions. This
research aims to provide the micro-foundations for the exchange-rate dynamics that having been missing
from general equilibrium macro models.
I structure my discussion of micro-based exchange-rate research as follows: Section 2 rst lays out the
key features of the FX market and describes how they are incorporated into a canonical model of currency
trading. I then discuss the empirical implications of the model. Section 3 examines research that links spot
rate dynamics to macroeconomic conditions via currency trading. Section 4 discusses how this research sheds
light on some long-standing puzzles concerning the behavior of exchange rates. Section 5 concludes with
some thoughts on the directions of future micro-based exchange-rate research.
2C u r r e n c y T r a d i n g M o d e l s
The goal of micro-based models is to build an exchange rate model from microeconomic foundations that
reasonably represent the key features of the FX market. In particular, the aim is to incorporate the institu-
tional implications of how information is transmitted from one agent to another as trading takes place, and
to study how this information ow is ultimately reected in the spot exchange rate. The fact that the models
describe trading between agents does not mean that the researchers using these models are only interested
in trading. Their focus remains on understanding exchange rate dynamics, but they are using models that
make detailed predictions about trading activity as well.
2.1 Features of the FX market
No model can incorporate all the institutional features of trading in the FX market ﾗ— its far too complex.
Instead, micro-based models focus on a small number of features that are essential for understanding the
main economic mechanisms at work. I summaries the key features below:
ﾕ• The FX market is a two-tier market comprising the interbank and retail markets: Trading takes place
between dealers working at banks in the interbank market, and between banks and their non-bank
customers in the retail tier. Neither market has a physical location. Trading takes place by phone
or electronically between participants located all around the world, but most trading in the interbank
market takes place between banks located in a few nancial centers: Tokyo, Singapore, Frankfurt,
New York, and particularly London. Trading can take place 24 hours a day, but activity is heavily
concentrated during the daytime hours of the main nancial centers.
ﾕ• FX dealers trade directly and indirectly in the interbank market. Direct interdealer trades result
from ﾓ“conversationsﾔ” between two dealers working at dierent banks in which they agree to exchange
one currency for another. This was the dominant form of interbank trading before the mid 1990s.
Since then most interbank trade has taken the indirect form in which dealers submit market and limit
orders to buy and sell currencies to electronic brokerages ( Reuters D2000-2 and EBS). These systems
prioritize the limit orders so that those with the best prices are matched rst with incoming market
orders.
ﾕ• No FX dealer has complete information about the state of the interbank market. Electronic brokerages
provide market-wide information on transaction prices, but dealers do not observe the structure of limit
2orders that determine market liquidity. Direct interdealer trading takes place simultaneously across
the interbank market. Dealers only have information on the trades they participate in.
ﾕ• FX dealers face constraints on both the duration and size of their FX positions. Dealersﾒ’ overnight
positions are typically small or zero.
ﾕ• Banks ll customer orders for currency in the retail tier of the market. The customer orders received
by banks represent the most important source of private information to FX dealers. Dealers working
at banks with a large customer base and a world-wide reporting system have a potentially important
informational advantage over other market participants.
ﾕ• Customer orders come from many dierent agent types and may be generated by allocative, speculative
and risk-management factors. Customer orders that are purely a function of current and past currency
prices are termed feedback orders.
2.2 The Portfolio Shifts Model
The Portfolio Shifts (PS) model incorporates many of these features into a model that examines how trading
in the interbank and retail tiers of the FX market relates to the evolution of the spot exchange rate. The
model describes trading in a single currency pair among a large number of dealers, a broker and between
dealers and investors over a stylized trading day.
2.2.1 Overview
There is one risky asset representing FX and one risk-free asset with a daily return of 1+r.T h ee c o n o m y
is populated by a continuum of risk-averse investors indexed by n 5 [0,1] and g risk-averse dealers indexed
by d. Each day t, is split into three trading rounds; l, ll and lll. The sequence of events throughout day t is
shown in Figure 1.
At the start of round l on day t, all investors and dealers observe the dividend paid to the current holders
of FX. The value of the dividend, Dt, is assumed to follow a random walk
Dt = Dt1 + Vt, (1)
where Vt  i.i.d.N(0,2
v). Realizations of Vt represent the arrival of public macroeconomic information over
time (e.g., changes in interest rates). At the start of the day each investor n also receives FX income,
Yn,t = Yt + n,t, (2)
where Yt and n,t are i.i.d. mean zero normal random variables that represent the aggregate and idiosyncratic
components of income. Yn,t is private information to each investor and generates a hedging motive for the
customer orders in period l trading. Investors do not initially observe either component, but in equilibrium
they learn the value of Yt by the end of day t.
The retail tier of the market opens in round l. Each dealer simultaneously and independently quotes a
scalar price at which they will ll customer orders to buy or sell FX. The round-l price quoted by dealer d is
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Figure 1:D a i l yT i m i n gi nt h eP o r t f o l i oS h i f t sM o d e l
denoted by Sl
d,t. Prices are publicly observed by all dealers and investors and are good for orders of any size.
Investors then place their orders for FX. Orders may be placed with more than one dealer. If two or more
dealers quote the same price, the customer order is randomly assigned among them. The customer orders
received by dealer d are denoted by Zl
d,t. Positive (negative) values of Zl
d,t denote net customer purchases
(sales) of FX. As in the actual retail market, customer orders, Zl
d,t, are only observed by dealer d.
Trading in the interbank tier of the market takes place in round ll. The broker and each dealer simulta-
neously and independently quotes a scalar price for FX, Sll
e,t and {Sll
d,t}g
d=1. The quoted prices are observed
by all dealers and are good for inter-dealer trades of any size. Each dealer then simultaneously and inde-
pendently trades on other dealersﾒ’ and the brokerﾒ’s quotes. I denote the FX orders made by dealer d as Tll
d,t
and orders received by dealer d as Zll
d,t. Orders received by the broker are denoted by Zll
e,t. When dealer d
initiates a purchases (sale) of FX, Tll
d,t is positive (negative). Positive values of Zll
d,t or Zll
e,t denote purchases
of FX initiated by another dealer. Once again, trading with multiple dealers and the broker is feasible. If
multiple agents quote the same price, trades are allocated equally between them. At the close of round ll





Interdealer order ow, Xt, simply aggregates the purchases of FX made by dealers initiating trades against
other dealersﾒ’ quotes and the brokerﾒ’s quote. Notice that order ow is dierent from trading volume.
Obviously there is a buyer and seller of FX in every trade, but only one dealer initiates each trade. Order
ow measures the direction of trading by identifying whether the buyer or seller of FX initiated the trade. As
we will see, order ow plays a very important role in this model and in micro-based exchange-rate research
more generally.
4The retail tier of the market re-opens in round lll. The broker and dealers again simultaneously and
independently quote prices, Slll
e,t and {Slll
d,t}g
d=1, at which they will ll dealer and customer orders, respectively.
Investors observe all the prices and then place theiro r d e r sw i t hd e a l e r s . A sa b o v e ,o r d e r sm a yb ep l a c e d
with more than one dealer and are randomly assigned to dealers quoting the same prices. The round lll
customer orders received by dealer d are denoted by Zlll
d,t. Once each dealer has lled his customer orders,
he can trade with the broker.
Clearly, this sequence of events represents a simplied view of trading in the actual foreign exchange
market. It does, however, allow us to analyze how information pertinent to the spot exchange rate is learnt
by dealers via trading. In particular, the focus of the model is on how information about the aggregate
demand for FX contained in the customer orders at the start of the day becomes learnt by dealers and
reected in the FX prices they quote at the end of day. As we shall see, this information aggregation process
produces an important empirical prediction linking trading activity to exchange rate dynamics.
The modelﾒ’s equilibrium comprises: (i) a set of optimal FX orders by investors in rounds l and lll; (ii) a
set of optimal FX price quotes by dealers in rounds l ﾗ— lll, and the broker in rounds ll and lll; and (iii) a set
of optimal dealer trading decisions in rounds ll and lll, such that markets clear (i.e., there is a counterparty
for every trade in each round).
2.2.2 Equilibrium
When all market participants act to maximize expected utility dened over future wealth, the equilibrium
of the model is summarized by:
1. All dealers quote the same price for FX in each round of trading, i.e. Si
d,t = Si
t for i = {I, II, III}. The
broker quotes the same price as dealers in rounds II and III. Common quotes are given by
Sl
t = Slll







t + dAt1 + {(Xt  E[Xt|
ll
g,t]), { > 0, (4c)
where At1 denotes investorsﾒ’ aggregate holding of FX at the end of day t1, and 
ll
g,t denotes common
information of dealers and the broker at the start of round II.
2. The trades initiated by dealer d in round II are
Tll
d,t = }Zl
d,t + dAt1, (5)
and the customer orders received by dealer d are in round I are
Zl
d,t =( /g)Yt + %d,t,  < 0, (6)
where
Sg
d=1 %d,t =0 .
There are several noteworthy features of this equilibrium. First, consider its implications for the behavior




rVt + {(Xt  E[Xt|
ll
t]). (7)
5Daily changes in the spot exchange rate are driven by shocks to dividends and unexpected interdealer order
ow. The former reect the eects of public news while the latter conveys information that was initially
dispersed across investors and was then aggregated via trading in the FX market.
Dividend shocks play a familiar role in the determination of the spot rate. Realizations of Vt are public
information, and aect the forecasts of future dividends by all dealers and investors in exactly the same way.
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that Vt shocks are immediately reected in the equilibrium spot
rate. That said, it is important to remember that quotes are chosen optimally in this model, so Vt shocks
only aect the spot rate because dealers have an incentive to adjust their quotes once the value of Vt is
known (see equation 4a).
The role played by aggregate interdealer order ow in (7) is more complex. Notice that it is unexpected
interdealer order ow that aects the exchange rate in (7). The reason is that dealers adjust their quotes
between rounds ll and lll to account for the new information contained in aggregate interdealer order ow
(see equation 4c). The customer orders received by each dealer reect the dierence between the desired
and actual FX positions of individual investors. As such, they convey information to dealers about both the
current income and the overnight positions ofas u b s e to fi n v e s t o r s . T h i si n f o r m a t i o ni se ectively shared
between dealers via interdealer trading in round ll. As a result, Xt conveys information about aggregate
income and the prior overnight FX position of all investors. Since the latter is already known to dealers,
Xt E[Xt|
l
t] is proportional to the new information concerning income that is incorporated into the round
lll quote, Slll
t .
Of course, the mere fact that unexpected interdealer order ow conveys new information about aggregate
income to dealers does not explain why XtE[Xt|
l
t] appears in equation (7). For that we need to understand
why dealers nd it optimal to incorporate the new income information they learn into their common round
lll quote. In short, why is information on aggregate income, Yt, relevant for the pricing of FX? The answer
is quite simple. As in the actual market, dealers do not want to hold FX overnight ﾗ— the risk of holding FX
can be shared more e!ciently by investors than by individual dealers. Consequently, each dealerﾒ’s aim in
round lll is to quote a price that will induce investors to purchases all the FX currently held by dealers. In
other words, the round lll quote is chosen so that the excess overnight return expected by investors is such
that they want to hold the entire existing stock of the FX. Obviously, this would not be possible unless all
dealers can calculate what the existing stock of FX is. However, since investorsﾒ’ income is the only source
of FX, the existing stock can be computed from the history of aggregate income. Thus, information on Yt is
price-relevant because it reveals to dealers what aggregate overnight FX position investors must be induced
to hold. In sum, interdealer order ow conveys information about the shift in the FX portfolios of investors
needed to achieve e!cient risk-sharing. This is the origin of the term, Portfolio Shifts.
Another important feature of the model concerns timing. As we noted above, public news concerning
current and future dividends is immediately and fully incorporated into the spot exchange rate. By contrast,
it takes time for the information concerning income to be reected in the dealer quotes. The reason for the
delay is important. Information about income is originally transmitted to dealers via the customer orders
they receive in round l. Thus, each dealer has some information about Yt at the start of round ll, but
the information is imprecise. At this point, each dealer could choose to use their private information on
Yt in setting their quote, but this is not optimal in the modelﾒ’s trading environment. Instead, their best
strategy is to quote the same price as in round l (which is the same across all dealers and only a function of
common round l information), because to do otherwise would expose the dealer to arbitrage trading losses.
As a result, the equilibrium spot rate remains unchanged between rounds l and ll even though dealers have
6information about aggregate income. The spot rate only incorporates this information when it becomes
common knowledge among dealers. This process of information aggregation takes place via interdealer
trading in round ll. The best strategy of each dealer is to use their private information concerning income
in determining the trade they wish to initiate with other dealers. It is for this reason that interdealer order
ow provides information on aggregate income that becomes common knowledge to dealers by the start of
round lll.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
Empirical support for the PS model rst came from regressions of the daily depreciation rate on interdealer
order ow and the change in the nominal interest dierential:.
st = 1Xt + 2(rt  ﾈǆ rt)+t, (8)
where st  st  st1 is change in the log spot rate between the end of days t  1 and t, rt is the nominal
dollar interest rate and ﾈǆ rt is the nominal non-dollar interest rate. These regressions are motivated by (7) with
st replacing Slll
t  Slll
t1, and actual interdealer order ow,X t, replacing Xt  E[Xt|
ll
t]. The rst of these
substitutions makes the empirical specication comparable to standard macro models but has no signicant
eect on the estimation results; the second is motivatedb yt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a te x p e c t e di n t e r d e a l e ro r d e r
ow is zero. The nominal interest dierential is included to account for the arrival of public news.
Table 1 shows regression results for the DM/USD and JPY/USD spot rates between May 1 to August
31, 1996. The data on interdealer order ow comes from the Reuters Dealing 2000-1 system. This was the
dominant platform for interdealer trading at the time, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of all ﾓ“directﾔ”
dealer-to-dealer trades. The table reports the coe!cient estimates and standard errors in parenthesis for ve
versions of equation (8).
Three features of the estimation results are particularly noteworthy:
1. The coe!cient on order ow, Xt, is is correctly signed and signicant, with tstatistics above 5 in
versions I, II and IV of the equation for both the DM/USD and JPY/USD. The positive sign indicates
that net dollar purchases ﾗ— a positive Xt ﾗ—l e a dt oah i g h e rF Xp r i c ef o rt h eD o l l a r .F o rp e r s p e c t i v e ,t h e
estimated value of 2.1 for the order ow coe!cient in the DM/USD equation translates to $1 billion
of net purchases increasing the DM price of a dollar by 0.8 pfennigs.
2. Almost all the explanatory power in the regressions is due to order ow. In specications III and
Vw h e r eo r d e row is omitted, the R2 statistics are less than 1 percent in both the DM/USD and
JPY/USD equations. Moreover, the explanatory power of order ow is extraordinarily high. The R2
statistics of 64 percent and 45 percent for the DM and JPY equations that include order ow are an
order of magnitude higher than those found in other exchange rate models.
3. The coe!cient on the change in the interest dierential is correctly signed, but is only signicant in
the JPY/USD equation. The positive sign arises in the sticky-price monetary model, for example,
because an increase in the US interest rate requires an immediate dollar appreciation (i.e. an increase
in JPY/USD) to make room for UIP-induced expected dollar depreciation.
7Table 1: Estimates of the Portfolio Shifts Model
Regressors
Xt (rt  ﾈǆ rt) rt1  ﾈǆ rt1 R2




















Notes: The table reports slope coe!cients and standard errors. Statistical signicance at
the 5% and 1% level is denoted by * and **. Source: Evans and Lyons (2002)
Figure 2 provides further perspective on the results in Table 1. Here the solid plots shows the path of
the spot exchange rate over the 4 month sample. The dashed plot shows cumulative order ow over the




i=1 Xi. If all variations in spot rates reected quote revisions driven only by order ow,
the daily change in the spot rate should be proportional to daily order ow; i.e., St  St1 = {Xt. Under
these circumstances, St = {X4
t so the plots should coincide. Figure 2 shows that this in not quite the case.
Nevertheless, it is hard not to be impressed by the close correspondence between exchange rates and order
ow over this sample period.
Figure 2 highlights two further features of the relation between order ow and currency returns. First,
although the equation in (8) is estimated at the daily frequency, the estimation results have implications for
the behavior of spot rates over much longer periods. In particular, since there is almost no serial correlation
in daily depreciation rates, the kday change in the log spot rate is well-approximated by
st  stk  = 1Xk




i=0 Xti denotes order ow during the past k days, and 2k(rt  ﾈǆ rt)+t,k identies the
impact of public news arriving during the same period. Thus, the rate of depreciation over k days will be
well-approximated by the cumulative eects of order ow, Xt,k, and the arrival of public news. Figure 2
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Figure 2: Exchange Rates (solid) and Cumulative Order Flow (dashed). Source: Evans
and Lyons (2002)
shows that there are many instances where st  stk  = 1Xk
t for signicant horizons k.
The second feature concerns the dynamics of order ow. The plots of cumulative order ow in Figure 2
display no signicant mean reversion because there is no detectable serial correlation in daily order ows.
This feature of the data is important because the empirical specication in (8) assumes that realizations of
daily order ow represent news to dealers. Thus daily order ow must be serially uncorrelated if the results
in Table 1 are to be consistent with the predictions of the PS model.
The estimates in Table 1 are representative of those obtained in a large number of studies. The strong
empirical link between interdealer order ows and daily changes in the spot exchange rate extends across
dierent currencies, dierent time periods and over horizons ranging from a few minutes to several weeks.
The results also extend to customer order ow. Recall that in the PS model interdealer order ow conveys
price-relevant information to dealers which initially entered the market in dispersed form via the customer
orders received by individual dealers. Consequently, we should expect to nd that customer order ows also
have explanatory power in accounting for exchange rate changes. This is indeed the case. Customer ows
disaggregated by customer type have more explanatorily power for exchange rate changes than the aggregate
ows received by individual banks. At the daily horizon, disaggregated ows account for less of the variation
in exchange rate changes than aggregate interdealer order ows, but the explanatory power of customer and
dealers ows are comparable over horizons of one to several weeks.
3F r o m M i c r o t o M a c r o
Microstructure exchange-rate models, such as the PS model, are silent on the potential links between the
macro economy and order ows because they focus on the details of currency trading between dierent
market participants rather than the macroeconomic factors that ultimately drive the individual trades. To
9address this deciency, recent research focuses on the role order ow plays in conveying macro information
to the foreign exchange market. This research builds on two central ideas: First, only some of the macro
information relevant for the current spot rate is publicly known at any point in time. Other information
is present in the economy, but it exists in a dispersed microeconomic form. The second idea relates to
determination of the spot rate. Since it literally is the price of foreign currency quoted by foreign exchange
dealers, the spot rate can only embed information that is known to dealers. Consequently, the spot rate will
only reect dispersed information once it has been assimilated by dealers ﾗ— a process that takes place via
trading. Below I provide an overview of a micro-based model that incorporates these ideas and discuss its
empirical implications.
3.1 A Micro-Based Model
The economy comprises two countries populated by a continuum of risk-averse agents, indexed by n 5 [0,1];
and g risk-averse dealers who act as marketmakers in the spot FX market. I will refer to the home and
foreign countries as the US and Europe, so the log spot exchange rate, st, denotes the dollar price of euros.
The only other actors in the model are the central banks (i.e., The Federal Reserve (FED) and the European
Central Bank (ECB)), who conduct monetary policy by setting short-term nominal interest rates, rt and ﾈǆ rt.
3.1.1 Overview
The model focuses on the currency trades between agents and dealers at a weekly frequency. At the start of
week t, all dealers and agents observe a data release that provides information on the state of the economy
several weeks earlier. Let zt denote a vector of variables that completely describe the state of the macro-
economy in week t. This vector contains variables that are directly observable, like short-term interest rates,
and others that only become publicly known with a lag. Each agent n also receives private information
concerning his or her current microeconomic environment: zn
t = zt + vn
t , where vn
t =[ vn
i,t] is a vector of
agent-specic shocks with the property that
U 1
0 vn
i,tdn =0for all i. Notice that the zn
t vector represents
dispersed private information about macro conditions.
Next, all dealers quote a log USD/EUR spot price equal to
st = Eg
tst+1 +ﾈǆ rt  rt  t, (9)
where Eg
t denotes expectations conditioned on the common information available to all dealers at the start
of week t. This information set includes the histories of interest rates and data releases, and the order ows
from earlier currency trading. The foreign exchange risk premium, t, is chosen by dealers to share risk
e!ciently across the FX market.
Macroeconomic conditions aect dealers quotes in (9) via their aects on current monetary policy (i.e.,
ﾈǆ rt rt), and via Eg
tst+1 insofar as these expectations are aected by dealersﾒ’ forecasts for the future interest
dierential. These forecasts are assumed to incorporate a view on how central banks react to changes in the
macroeconomy. In particular,
Eg
t(ﾈǆ rt+i  rt+i)=( 1+)Eg
t (ﾈǆ pt+1+i  pt+1+i)+yEg
t (ﾈǆ yt+i  yt+i)  %Eg
t%t+i, (10)
for i>0, where ,y and % are positive coe!cients. Equation (10) implies that dealers expect the future
dierential between euro and dollar rates to be higher when: (i) the future dierence between EU and US
10ination, ﾈǆ pt+1 pt+1, is higher; (ii) the dierence between the EU and US output gaps, ﾈǆ yt yt, widens;
or (iii) when the real exchange rate, %t  st +ﾈǆ pt  pt, depreciates. These expectations are consistent with
widely-accepted views about how central banks react to changing macroeconomic conditions.
Dealers stand ready to ll the foreign currency orders of agents at their quoted price of st. Once agent
n 5 [0,1] observes st, they place their currency order with a dealer to ll their desired demand for euros.
The order ow for euros from agent n is therefore n
t n
t1 where n
t denotes the week- t demand by agent
n. This demand is given by
n
t = s (En
t st+1 +ﾈǆ rt  rt)+hn
t , (11)
where s > 0 and En
t denotes expectations conditioned on the information available to agent n after the spot
rate is quoted at the start of week t. The demand for euros depends on the log excess return expected by the
agent and a hedging term, hn
t , that represents the inuence of all other factors. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that hn
t = zzn
t , for some vector z, where the vector zn
t describes the microeconomic
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t dn is the aggregate hedging demand and E
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t st+1dn. Notice that ht = z
U 1
0 zn
t dn = zzt, so the aggregate hedging demand depends on
the state of the macroeconomy, zt.
For the remainder of the week, dealers trade among themselves. The model abstracts from the details of
interdealer trade. Instead, consistent with the PS model, it assumes that all dealers learn the aggregate order
ow that resulted from the earlier weekt trades between agents and dealers. This order ow is determined
by
Xt+1 = t  t1. (13)
Notice that order ow is drriven by changes in the average of agentsﾒ’ expectations concerning future excess
returns and the change in the aggregate hedging demand. (The t +1subscript makes clear that order ow
is only observed by dealers at the end of week-t trading.)
3.1.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model comprises a sequence of spot rates and market-clearing order ows that sup-
port and are supported by the endogenous evolution of dealersﾒ’ common information and agentsﾒ’ private
information. Recall that dealers and agents observe current interest rates and the data releases containing
information on past macroeconomic conditions. Dealers also obtain information from their observations on
order ow that is endogenously determined by the trading decisions of agents. Similarly, each agent observes
the endogenously determined spot rate together with their microeconomic environment.
Solving for equilibrium spot rates and order ows is complex. But, so long as public information about the
current state of macroeconomy is incomplete, equilibrium order ows provide dealers with information about
the macroeconomy that they will embed in the spot rate quotes; information that was initially dispersed
across agents as their observations on zn
t .
In equilibrium, the spot rate quoted by dealers satises equation (9) subject to the risk-sharing restriction
11that identies the risk premium, and dealersﾒ’ expectations concerning future interest rates in (10):









with   1/(1 + %) < 1, where
ft =( 1+)(ﾈǆ pt+1  pt+1)+y (ﾈǆ yt  yt)+(
1
 )(pt  ﾈǆ pt).
The three terms on the right of equation (14) identify dierent factors aecting the log spot rate dealers
quote at the start of week t. First, the current stance of monetary policy aects dealersﾒ’ quotes via the
interest dierential, ﾈǆ rt rt, because it directly contributes to the payo from holding euros until week t+1.
Second, dealers are concerned with the future course of macro fundamentals, ft. This term embodies dealersﾒ’
expectations of how central banks will react to macroeconomic conditions when setting future interest rates.
The third factor arises from risk-sharing between dealers and agents as represented by the present and






t+1 = st+1  E
n
t st+1. Intuitively, dealers stabilize their euroh o l d i n g sb yl o w e r i n gt h er i s kp r e m i u m
when they anticipate a rise in the aggregate hedging demand for euros because the implied fall in the excess
return agentsﾒ’ expect will oset their desire to accumulate larger euro holdings. Dealers also reduce the
risk premium to oset agentsﾒ’ desire to accumulate larger euro holdings when they are viewed as being too





In equilibrium, the aggregate order ow dealers observe at the end of week-t trading reects the change
in aggregate demand for foreign currency by agents between weeks t  1 and t: Xt+1 = t  t1. Since
dealers know the history of order ow and t1 =
S4
i=0 Xti by market clearing, t1 5 
g
t. Consequently,
unexpected order ow from week-t trading can be written as
Xt+1  Eg
tXt+1 = z(zt  Eg
tzt)+s(E
n




Thus order ow contributes new information about the current macroeconomic conditions, zt, via the ag-
gregate hedging demand, ht  Eg
tht = z(zt  Eg
tzt), and about the average of agentsﾒ’ spot rate forecasts,
E
n
t st+1. These forecasts will embed agents private expectations concerning future interest rates, and the
macroeconomic conditions that aect monetary policy.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
We can use equations (14) ﾗ— (16) to examine the modelsﾒ’ empirical implications. Consider, rst, the behavior
or excess returns, ert+1 = st+1+ﾈǆ rtrt. Equation (9) implies that, ert+1 = t+st+1Eg
tst+1, so substituting
for the dealersﾒ’ forecast errors gives
ert+1 = t +( 1 Eg








Notice that the second and third terms depend on the ow of information reaching all dealers between
the start of weeks t and t +1 . This information ow comprises observations on current interest rates, data
12releases on past macro variables, and order ow from weekt trading, Xt+1. Equation (17) implies that any
of these information sources will aect the excess returns insofar as they convey new information on current
monetary policy, future fundamentals and the risk premia. Thus the model attributes the strong correlation
between foreign currency returns and order ows observed in the data to the important role order ow plays
in this information transmission process.
We can examine this implication of the model with a two step regression procedure. In the rst step we





t+1 = Xt+1  Eg
tXt+1, so the regression coe!cient on X4
t+1 should be statistically
signicant if unexpected order ow from weekt trading contains information about macro variable yt.I n
the second step we regress excess returns on the predicted values from the rst stage. The estimated slope
coe!cient in this regression should be statistically signicant when the information concerning yt conveyed
by order ow is price-relevant.
Table 2 reproduces the results from estimating the second stage regression as reported in Evans (2010).
The dependent variable is the excess return on the USD/EUR spot over a 4 week horizon. The dependent
variables in Panel A are the predicted values from regressions of GDP growth, CPI ination and M1 growth
in the US and Germany on cumulated customer order ows for euros received by Citibank. In panel B the
dependent variables are the dierences between the predicted values fort h eG e r m a na n dU Sm a c r ov a r i a b l e s .
The regressions are estimated at the weekly frequency in data from January 1993 to June 1999.
Table 2: Excess Returns and Macro Information
GDP CPI M1 R2








0·14 0·11 1·14 0·48 1·65 0·69 0.29








0·90 0·52 0·19 0.23
(0·43) (0·25) (0·30)
Notes: The table reports slope coe!cients and standard errors from the second stage regression
using the predicted values for the variables listed at the head of each column. Estimates are
calculated at the weekly frequency. The standard errors correct for heteroskedasticity. and an
MA(3) error process. Statistical signicance at the 5% and 1% level is denoted by * and **.
Source: Evans (2010)
13The results in Table 2 provide strong support for the idea that order ows convey price-relevant informa-
tion about GDP, prices and the money stock. The slope coe!cients for German ination, US GDP growth,
ination and monetary growth are all signicant at the one percent level. Insofar as spot rates reect the
dierence between US and EU monetary policy, order ows should carry more price-relevant information
about the dierence in macroeconomic conditions between countries. This seems to be the case. As Panel
Bs h o w s ,t h es l o p ec o e !cients on the predicted values for GDP growth and ination are highly signicant.
The model also holds implications for the links between the dynamics of spot rates, order ows and the








t+i(ft+i  t+i) (18)
where s





This equation splits the factors aecting dealersﾒ’ spot rate quotes into two terms. Current conditions, such as
interest rats and dealerﾒ’s estimates of weekt fundamentals aect dealersﾒ’ quotes via s
t. Expected changes
in future conditions (i.e., ination, the output gaps and the risk premium), aect the spot rate via the second
term. It is this term that provides the link between spot rates, order ows and the future path of macro
variables.
Equation (18) implies that st  s
t will have forecasting power for any future macro variable, yt+, if
dealers expectations, Eg
tyt+, are correlated with Eg
t(ft+it+i). Intuitively, dealers will raise their spot
rate quotes relative to s
t when their forecasts of future changes in fundamentals increase, so if these forecast
are correlated with Eg
tyt+, variations in sts
t will have forecast power for yt+. Equation (18) also implies
that order ow should generally have incremental forecasting power for future macro variables beyond that
contained in st  s




t)yt+ +( 1 Eg
t+1)yt+. (19)
The rst term on the right identies dealersﾒ’ expectations concerning yt+ based on the information they use
to quote spot rates at the start of week t. The second term identies the revision in dealersﾒ’ forecasts between
the start of weeks t and t+1. The incremental forecasting power of order ow comes from this term, which,
by construction, is uncorrelated with Eg
tyt+. In particular, any information conveyed by Xt+1  Eg
tXt+1
concerning yt+ will lead dealers to revise their forecasts of yt+.
This implication of the model can be examined with a regression of yt+ on st and other variables
known to dealers at the start of week t, and unexpected order ow from trades between dealers and agents
during week t. The coe!cients on the order ows should be statistically signicant if they have incremental
forecasting power for the macro variable in question. Furthermore, the portion of the predicted value for
yt+ attributable to the order ows should make a signicant contribution to the variance of yt+ if the
information conveyed by the order ows is economically signicant.
Figure 3 reproduces the plots from Evans and Lyons (2009) that show the variance contributions of the
order ows together with 95 percent condence bands for the six macro variables considered in Table 2 for
14A: US GDP Growth B: German GDP Growth
C: US Ination D: German Ination
E: US M1 Growth F: German M1 Growth
Figure 3: Estimated Contribution of Order Flows to the Variance of Future GDP growth,
Ination and M1 growth by forecasting horizon, , measured in weeks. Dashed lines denote
95% percent condence bands computed as ±1.96ﾈǆ , where ﾈǆ  is the standard error of the
estimated contribution. Source: Evans and Lyons (2009)
horizons  =1 ,..,26 weeks. In ve of the six cases, the contributions rise steadily with the horizon and are
quite sizable beyond one quarter. The exception is US GDP growth, where the contribution remains around
15 percent from the quarterly horizon onward. These plots clearly show that order ows have considerable
forecasting power for the future ows of information concerning GDP growth, ination and M1 growth at
all but the shortest horizons. Clearly, then, these order ows are carrying signicant information on future
macroeconomic conditions.
154M i c r o P e r s p e c t i v e s o n E x c h a n g e - R a t e P u z z l e s
Micro-based models provide a new perspective on some long-standing puzzles concerning the behavior of
exchange rates over horizons ranging from a few minutes to several years. Below I discuss the micro-based
perspective on the Disconnect and News puzzles.
4.1 The Disconnect Puzzle
The exchange rate Disconnect Puzzle refers to the observation that most short- and medium-term variations
in spot exchange rates appear to be unrelated to changes in current or expected future macro variables that
should identify fundamentals. In other words, exchange-rate variations appear essentially disconnected from
changing macroeconomic conditions over horizons up to several years.
To gain a micro-based perspective on this puzzle, consider the week-by-week variations in the log spot
rate implied by the micro-based the model:
st+1 = rt  ﾈǆ rt + t
+( 1 Eg










i1(ft+i  t+i). (20)
It is well-established that interest dierentials and other macro variables have very little forecasting power
for short- and medium-term depreciation rates (see, e.g., Table 1). Thus, as a purely empirical matter, there
appears to be little prospect to establishing the link between short-term variations in spot rates and macro
variables known at the start of week t via interest rates and the risk premium terms; rt, ﾈǆ rt and t . Instead,
we must focus our attention on the terms in the second and third lines of equation (20). The two terms
in the second line identify the eects of new information concerning current macroeconomic conditions, i.e.,
conditions at the start of week t +1 . The rst identies the eect of unanticipated changes in short-term
interest rates. In practice, central banks change interest rates relatively rarely; and when they do, they
often communicate their intentions beforehand so as not to put undue stress on the nancial system. As
a result, unanticipated changes in short-term interest are not an important source of high-frequency spot
rate dynamics over long time spans. This leaves the terms involving macro fundamentals, ft, and the risk
premium, t.I ti si nt h ei d e n t i cation of these terms that the macro and micro-based perspectives dier.
Macro models typically assume that uncovered interest parity holds (or the risk premium is constant) so
their focus is on the terms involving fundamentals. If the current state of the macroeconomy is known to all










Under normal circumstances, the rst term in this expression should be close to zero because macro fun-
damentals are unlikely to change signicantly during a week. Thus, from a macro perspective, the lionﾒ’s
share of the link between macro fundamentals and high-frequency spot rate dynamics must be attributable
to the second term (i.e., the revisions in forecasts about future changes in fundamentals, ft+i for i>1).
However, the time series properties of the macro variables used to construct fundamentals, ﾈǆ ft, imply very
little variation in the estimates of the present value of future changes in ﾈǆ ft.A s a r e s u l t , e s t i m a t e s o f t h e
16second term in (21) using ﾈǆ ft account for roughly ve percent of the variance of the depreciation rates at the
monthly and quarterly horizons. By this metric, the high frequency movements in exchange rates appear
largely disconnected from measured macro fundamentals.
The micro-based perspective on the disconnect puzzle is rather dierent because all the terms on the
right of equation (20) involving fundamentals and the risk premium could link short-term variations in spot
rates to the macroeconomy.
Consider the terms involving fundamentals. When the weekly changes in fundamentals are negligible











From a micro-based perspective, dealers are not assumed to have contemporaneous information on the macro
variables that comprise fundamentals, so the rst term in (22) can dier from zero (because dealers are
learning about past macroeconomic conditions that drive ft). Moreover, this term appears to be signicant
empirically. As Table 2 showed, order ow from week-t trading convey signicant new information concerning
current GDP, prices and money stocks, that is incorporated into spot rates. Thus, some of the high frequency
behavior of exchange rates reects the ow of new information reaching dealers concerning the slowly evolving
state of the macroeconomy.
The micro-based model also provides a new perspective on the second term in (22). Figure 2 shows that
order ows have signicant incremental forecasting power for future macro variables beyond that contained
in current spot rates and other variables. Insofar as dealers use the information in these ows to revise
their expectations, estimates of the second term in (22) based on macro data will understate the degree to
which revisions in dealers expectations concerning future changes in fundamentals contribute to spot rate
dynamics.
In sum the micro-based evidence compliments rather than contradicts the empirical evidence derived from
macro models on the link between spot rates and the macroeconomy. By concentrating on the ows of infor-
mation available to dealers, micro-based models point to the role of order ow as a carrier of macroeconomic
information. This information appears useful in revising forecasts of future changes in macro fundamentals,
the channel emphasized by macro models. It also appears useful in revising dealerﾒ’s estimates of current
macroeconomic conditions.
4.2 The News Puzzle
One striking symptom of the Disconnect Puzzle shows up in research on the eects of macro data releases.
This research shows that spot rates react to data releases in a manner consistent with the predictions of
standard macro models, but the releases account for less than one percent of the total variance in spot rates.
In other words, most of the volatility in spot rates takes place during periods when there are no data releases.
This represents a puzzle from the macro perspective. Macro exchange-rate models predict that spot rates
will respond immediately to the public release of macro data if it induces: (i) a change in current interest
rates and/or the risk premium, and/or (ii) a revision in expectations concerning future fundamentals and/or
the risk premia. The models do not predict that spot rates will respond to all data releases, or even to
previously unexpected releases. Nor do they predict the size or direction of the spot rateﾒ’s response to
particular releases. They do, however, rule out the possibility that the spot rateﾒ’s response is delayed.
17Consequently, only the variations in spot rates immediately following a data release are attributable to the
eects of macro news.
Micro-based models provide several new perspectives on how the release of macro data aects the behavior
of spot rates. First, data releases will only aect spot rates insofar as they induce dealers to revise their
spot rate quotes. Since data releases relate to past macroeconomic conditions, it is possible that most of the
information they contain was already known to dealers from their past observations on order ows. A data
release may contain new information about the macroeconomy relative to prior public information, but it
may contain little incremental information to dealers. Consequently, the initial reaction of the spot rate to a
data release will be smaller than if order ow were uninformative about current macroeconomic conditions.
The immediate reaction of the spot rate to a data release may also be muted for other reasons. Although
data releases are simultaneously observed by dealers and other agents, there may not be unanimous agreement
on their implications for the value of foreign currency. For example, two rms may interpret the same
announcement on last quarterﾒ’s GDP as having dierent implications for future interest rates. When a
data release contains imprecise but price-relevant information, dealers will immediately adjust their spot
rate quotes to accommodate the new information on fundamentals and the risk of providing liquidity to the
market. These eects can oset one-another, so that immediate impact of the data release on the spot rate
is muted.
Diering interpretations about the implications of a data release can also lead to changes in dealers spot
rate quotes for some time after the release takes place. Some of these changes reect the risk premia that
was embedded in dealers original quotes. Others reect the eects of order ow on dealersﾒ’ quotes as market
participants reach a consensus about the price-implications of the release. For example, suppose the data
release represents good news for the dollar, but there is diverse opinion on how far the dollar price of euros
should fall. Under these circumstances, the initial fall in the USD/EUR spot rate may be viewed as too
large by some market participants and too small by others. Those who view the fall as too small will place
orders to sell the euro, while those who view the fall as too large will place orders to buy. In aggregate, the
balance of these trades represents the order ow that dealers use to further revise their spot rate quotes. In
particular, positive (negative) order ow for the euro signals that the initial USD/EUR spot rate was below
(above) the balance of opinion among market participants concerning the implications of the data release.
Empirical research supports this micro-based perspective on the eects of data releases. Studies of
intraday data indicate that data releases aect spot rates directly and indirectly via induced order ows.
Furthermore, order ows appear to carry more price-relevant information that is incorporated into spot rates
following macro data releases than at other times. At the daily frequency, more than one third of the total
variance in spot rate changes can be related to the direct and indirect eects of macro data releases and
other news sources. The indirect eects of news working via order ow contribute approximately 60 percent
more to the variance of spot rate changes than do the direct eects. In short, micro-based research shows
that data releases play a more important role in the determination of spot rates than was indicated by earlier
research based on macro models.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Although micro-based research over the past has made some signicant progress towards providing exchange-
rate models with empirically relevant microfoundations, much remains to be done. The models developed
to date are designed to study the behavior major currency markets with lots of trading activity, such as the
18USD/EUR and USD/JPY markets. They are less well-suited for studying the behavior of exchange rates
between other currencies that trade with much less liquidity. Since the currencies of most counties fall into
this category, adapting micro-based models to these markets is an important priority for future research.
The models also need to expand their focus beyond the spot markets. Trade in forward contracts, swaps and
other exchange-rate derivatives account for a large share of FX trading activity, but this portion of the FX
market has yet to be studied from a micro-based perspective. This will surely change as data from electronic
trading systems becomes more accessible to researchers.
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